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Spousal and survivor pensions are two important provisions of the US Social Se-
curity pension system. In this paper, we assess the impact of these benefits on the
female employment rate in the context of a full life-cycle model in which house-
holds decide on female labor supply and savings. One important aspect of our
model is that we allow for returns to labor market experience so that participation
decisions affect not only current earnings and Social Security pension eligibility
but also future earnings. We quantify the effect on female labor supply and on
household inequality of (i) removing spousal benefit, (ii) removing both spousal
and survivor pension benefits, and (iii) extending from 35 to 40 the number of
periods of the working career that are considered when calculating the retired
worker’s pension. We find that reforms (i) and (ii) significantly increase female
employment throughout the life cycle, whereas reform (iii) has a very mild effect.
The effect of (ii) on income inequality in older household is large, whereas the ef-
fect on consumption inequality is small. All three reforms have substantial effects
on Social Security expenditure and fiscal revenues.
Keywords. Social Security, Spousal and Survivor Benefits, Women’s Labor Market
Participation.
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1. Introduction
Over the last few years several papers have explored the impact of Social Security on
incentives to work.1 Most of these papers exclusively analyze the case of men. In a
partial equilibrium framework, Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2005) and French and
Jones (2012) found that public pension plans have major effects on the labor supply
of older male workers, but that the labor supply of young men is not very responsive
to changes in pension rules. In a general equilibrium framework, Wallenius (2013) and
Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2012) found that differences in Social Security programs
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and taxation account for a substantial fraction of the differences in men’s aggregate
hours worked between the US and continental European countries. However, there has
been little analysis of the effect of Social Security on female labor supply, in particular, in
terms of analyzing the impact over a full life cycle. We believe that this may be of interest
for several reasons. First, at an individual level the system redistributes in favor of low
earners since the pension formula is a concave function of average lifetime earnings.
This may favor women more than men because of the well-documented gender earn-
ings gap. Second, the pension system provides second earners with a spousal benefit
equivalent to 50% of the first earner’s pension benefit, if she is not eligible for a retired
worker’s pension or if her retired worker’s pension is lower than that. If the first earner
passes away, this is increased to 100% of the deceased spouse’s pension (survivor pen-
sion benefit). These provisions work as a minimum pension for second earners and, as
the literature has shown, minimum pensions may have a substantial impact on labor
supply at an older age; see, for instance, Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez-Martín (2007).
The elimination of spousal and survivor benefits can increase female labor supply by
reducing household Social Security wealth and by reducing the effective tax rate on the
second earner’s labor income. It is especially important to assess this reform at a time
when developed countries are facing serious problems in achieving financial stability in
their public pension systems. Finally, the pension formula establishes that benefits are
a function of the 35 years of highest adjusted earnings over the whole working career,
so the system redistributes from those individuals with a history of contributions longer
than 35 years toward those with 35 years of contribution only. This favors individuals
with spells out of the labor market that occur at child-bearing ages, typically in the case
of mothers.
The aim of this paper is to achieve a further understanding of female labor market in-
centives under the Social Security pension rules in the US. We use a partial equilibrium
life-cycle model in which forward-looking households make decisions on savings and
female labor market participation. In the model, labor market participation decisions
affect current earnings, future earnings (through a learning-by-doing technology) and
Social Security pension benefits. Households face uncertainty on earnings and survival.
Our model features the US pension system and provides a satisfactory representation of
the life-cycle employment behavior of women and of the distribution of public pensions
for men and women observed in the data. We conduct several policy assessment exer-
cises: (i) removal of spousal benefit, (ii) removal of both spousal and survivor pension
benefits, and (iii) extension from 35 to 40 of the number of periods of the working career
that are considered in calculating the retired worker’s pension. We find that removing
the spousal and the survivor pension benefits has a substantial effect on women’s em-
ployment decisions over the life cycle, in particular after the age of 40. The average effect
goes from an increase in the employment rate of four percentage points, in the case in
which only spousal pension benefit is removed, to 10 percentage points in the case in
which both spousal and survivor pension benefits are taken away. However, extending
the number of years considered in calculating pension benefits has a negligible effect on
participation.
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There are a few other papers with a similar focus to ours. First, in the context of a
reduced form participation model, Blau (1997) finds a moderately small negative im-
pact of spousal benefit provision on labor force participation by older married women.
Second, van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and Casanova (2010) estimate structural dy-
namic models of saving and participation decisions of households, but consider only
older couples. In the context of general equilibrium models, Nishiyama (2010) and
Kaygusuz (2015) consider a two-adult household model to assess changes in the US So-
cial Security pension rules. In contrast to Kaygusuz (2015), who uses a 7-year period
model, we consider a 1-year period model and introduce earnings and wage uncer-
tainty. One distinctive features of our model with respect to both the aforesaid papers
is that wages are endogenous through a learning-by-doing technology. The endogeneity
of wages is an important aspect that may enhance the response of the labor supply at
early ages to changes in incentives to work. The importance of labor market experience
is emphasized in Wallenius (2013), but her analysis focuses on males only. Finally, a re-
cent paper by Groneck and Wallenius (2017) explored the labor supply effects and the
redistributional consequences of the US Social Security system across marital status.
Our paper is also related to a strand of the literature that analyzes the determi-
nants of female labor market participation and its trend over time. Greenwood, Seshadri,
and Yorukoglu (2005) explored the role played by the development and dissemination
of household appliances in explaining the increase in the labor force participation of
women. There are other papers that emphasize changes in medical/contraceptive tech-
nology, such as for instance Goldin and Katz (2002) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2016). In
the context of a life-cycle model, Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008) explore the
effect of child-care costs and female wages relative to males on the employment behav-
ior of different cohorts of women. The impact of family-friendly policies on female labor
supply has also been extensively explored in empirical papers such as Waldfogel (1998)
or Ruhm (1998) and in quantitative papers such as Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2010),
Domeij and Klein (2013), and Low and Sánchez-Marcos (2015). More recently, Eckstein
and Lifshitz (2011), Fernández and Wong (2014), and Guvenen and Rendall (2015) ana-
lyzed the impact of changes in education distribution, marital stability, wages, and fer-
tility on female labor market behavior across several cohorts. Finally, Guner, Kaygusuz,
and Ventura (2012) focused on the consequences of different tax policies on female labor
supply. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing on Social Security pension
rules, the effects of which have only partially been explored on female labor supply.
One limitation of our analysis is that we assume the exogenous labor supply of hus-
bands. This may be a reasonable assumption for middle-aged men, but it is controversial
for men close to retirement. Therefore, our results provide an upper bound of the female
labor supply response to different policy reforms, as the effects may be lower if husbands
are also allowed to react. Nevertheless, we believe that our paper makes a contribution
to the literature by focusing on the response of women’s labor supply (given exogenous
labor income from husbands), in contrast to most of the previous literature that instead
focuses on the response of men’s labor supply (but completely ignores other sources of
household earnings). Finally, we acknowledge that ignoring general equilibrium effects
is a limitation of our research as assuming fixed wages and interest rates may lead to the
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response of labor supply and savings to policy changes being overstated. However, we
leave the analysis of those effects for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy
used for the analysis and Section 3 gives the calibration for the US economy. Section 4
presents the policy assessment exercises and a robustness analysis of the results. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2. Model economy
In this section, we set out the model economy that we use to analyze the reform of
several aspects of the US Social Security pension system. We consider a partial equi-
librium life-cycle model in which unitary households face earnings and lifespan uncer-
tainty. Households enter the economy with no assets and make decisions on savings
and female labor market participation. We consider only the extensive margin decision
of female labor supply and assume that all working women work the same number of
hours.2 Men work in all periods up to an exogenously given retirement age at which they
claim their corresponding Social Security pensions. We ignore any general equilibrium
effects of the policy reforms that we implement, but female wages are endogenous as
we assume that they depend on labor market experience. This is an important feature in
studying female labor supply decisions because it introduces an additional trade-off of
labor market spells. First, there is empirical evidence that accumulated labor market ex-
perience is highly correlated with wages (see, for instance, Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)).
In these circumstances, labor market spells related to child-bearing have a trade-off in
terms of future wages that may be important in understanding labor supply decisions.
Second, according to the current rules of the US Social Security pension system, the in-
dividual pension benefit is a concave function of average lifetime earnings. Finally, we
assume that women, if eligible, claim their Social Security pensions at an exogenous
given age. However, as we show in Section 4.4, alternative assumptions on the claiming
age do not significantly affect the impact on female labor supply of the reforms that we
assess.3
2.1 Demographics
Household size evolves exogenously over a life cycle. We assume that all households
are initially made up of two adults who remain married. Therefore, we ignore the
possibility of divorce, but we offer a detailed discussion about this assumption in Sec-
tion 4.4.4 Household size changes deterministically with the arrival and emancipation
of children, but it changes stochastically as individuals die. This is an essential feature
2French and Jones (2012) find that in the case of men, most changes in life-cycle labor supply in response
to changes in pension rules occur along the extensive margin.
3In Appendix A (available in a supplementary file on the journal website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/
667/supplement.pdf), we provide a detailed description of the solution method for the model we set out
below.
4According to Social Security rules, divorced women whose marriage had lasted more than 10 years are
eligible to claim spousal benefit based on the ex-spouse’s earnings record if they remain unmarried.
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of the model since we are interested, among other things, in exploring the effect of the
survivor pension benefit on female labor supply. However, all household members die
at age T . In addition, we assume that from period TR onward both spouses are retired
from the labor market.
2.2 Earnings
The earnings process includes two important aspects of the data: earnings uncertainty
and earnings growth over a life cycle. First, we assume that both female and male earn-
ings, yft and y
m




t , which are positively corre-
lated. In particular, we assume
v
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t = vft−1 + ξft 





























The assumption of permanent shocks implies that the variance of earnings in-
creases over the life cycle, consistent with what is observed in the data (see, for instance,
Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011)). Under this assumption, the slope of the variance of
the earnings life-cycle profile gives the variance of the permanent shock.
Second, in order to capture the increasing male earnings life-cycle profile we feed ex-
ogenous growth as a two-parameter function of age. Therefore, the husband’s earnings
are calculated as follows:
ln ymt = lnym0 + αm1 t + αm2 t2 + vmt  (3)
In contrast, growth in wives’ earnings is endogenous. We assume a learning-by-
doing technology and denote by xt the total number of years of labor market expe-
rience in period t. Therefore, experience at the beginning of period t + 1 is given by
xt+1 = xt + pt , where pt is the discrete female labor supply choice which takes value
one if the wife works and zero otherwise. We assume that female earnings are a two-
parameter function of experience
ln yft = ln yf0 + αf1xt + αf2x2t + vft  (4)
2.3 Social security
In the economy, there is a pay-as-you-go pension system that mimics the current US
system. There is a Social Security payroll tax τss that is a proportional tax on individ-
ual earnings with an earnings ceiling for contributions. Social Security benefits bg, with
g = {fm}, are a concave function of each individual’s average lifetime earnings. In line
with US Social Security rules, the individual pension benefit is calculated as a concave
function of the individual’s average lifetime earnings. More specifically, it is a function
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of the N years of highest adjusted earnings over the whole working career, including
years with zero earnings if needed to total N years. This is known as Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings (AIME). Furthermore, a minimum number of years of contribution
Nmin is required for individuals to be eligible for a public pension. We consider that
each married household is entitled to the husband’s retired worker’s pension benefit. In
addition, the wife is eligible for a Social Security pension benefit in the amount of her
corresponding retired worker’s pension or a fraction of her husband’s pension benefit
(spousal benefit), whichever is higher.5 Survivors get their own retired worker’s pension
benefit or their spouse’s pension benefit (survivor pension benefit), whichever is higher.
As a result, women may be dually entitled as retired workers and as spouses or survivors.
The complete labor market history of each individual is needed in order to calculate
each individual AIME, and thus the corresponding pension benefit. However, keeping
track of the complete labor market history of each spouse is computationally very costly
and unfeasible in this model which allows for savings decisions and features the de-
gree of earnings uncertainty at an individual level observed in the data. At this point,
we proceed in the same way as many other papers in the literature which consider an
approximation of the AIME.6 Our approximation is based on the last working period
earnings and the number of years of contribution to the pension system. In Appendix B
(available in a supplementary file on the journal website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/
667/supplement.pdf), we provide a detailed description of this approximation and we
discuss its degree of accuracy.
According to Social Security rules, individuals can begin to receive their Social Secu-
rity benefit once they reach the earliest claim age (TECA). The benefit is adjusted down-
ward if it is claimed before the normal retirement age, that we denote by TNCA, and up-
ward if it is postponed until after the normal retirement age. Furthermore, as a result of
the Earnings Test, a Social Security beneficiary (either as a retired worker or as a spouse)
who is below normal retirement age and receives labor income that exceeds an exempt
amount will see part of her benefit taxed away (τet). However, the benefit is adjusted
upwards once the individual reaches the normal retirement age in order to compensate
her for withheld benefits. In particular, the Social Security Administration calculates the
number of months that benefits have been withheld and will recalculate the benefit at
normal retirement age by adding those months to the original claiming age.
After retirement, public pensions bm and bf are the only source of household income
apart from the returns on assets.
2.4 Taxes
We assume that there is a progressive income tax on the household’s income. It is an
important feature of the tax system that the household (rather than the individual) con-
stitutes the basic unit of taxation, which results in high tax rates on secondary earners.
5We assume here that the husband is the main breadwinner.
6See, for instance, Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2012) who assume that each individual obtains a pen-
sion that depends on the average lifetime earnings of her ability type and ignore the stochastic individ-
ual component of earnings in determining pensions. Other approaches are followed in Pistaferri and Low
(2015) or İmrohoroğlu and Kitao (2012).
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Therefore, the first dollar made by a married female entering the labor market is taxed
at her husband’s current marginal rate. In the context of a very similar model to ours,
Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) show that this has important consequences on
married women’s labor supply.
2.5 Child care cost
We assume that, if a woman with children decides to work, then the household incurs
child care expenses. Child care costs evolve exogenously with household composition,
in particular, with the number and age of children living at home. We denote the child
care units needed at age t by kt and the price of each unit of child care by q. Therefore,
the total child care cost ft paid by a two-earner household in period t is given by ft = qkt .
2.6 Household’s problem
Households derive utility from consumption and disutility from female labor supply.
In particular, we assume that there is a fixed utility cost of work that may change with
women’s age.
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
where at represents beginning-of-period household assets, xt is beginning of period fe-
male labor market experience, vt is the vector of husband and wife earnings shocks, bt
is the vector of husband and wife Social Security benefits, st is the vector of the number
of periods for which a female retired worker’s pension is withheld and the number of
periods for which her spousal benefit is withheld between claiming age and normal re-
tirement age (as a result of the Earnings Test).7 These therefore comprise the set of state
variables in the model economy. Thus, utility depends on total household consump-
tion ct , the number of adult-equivalent members of the household et , and the partic-
ipation decision pt . The participation choice and the consumption choice at period t
7Note that a woman is eligible for spousal benefit only once her husband becomes a public pension
beneficiary. Therefore, a wife’s Social Security pension benefit at the claiming age may be different from her
pension benefit after her husband retires.
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determine the endogenous state variables (assets and labor market experience) at the
start of the next period. Households can save, but are not allowed to borrow.8 Finally,
V Mpt (·) is the value function of a married household, V Wfpt (·) is the value function of a
widow household and V Wm(·) is the value function of a widower household. The proba-
bility of surviving from age t to age t + 1 for an individual of gender g is given by πgtt+1,
g= {fm}. Finally, β is the discount factor.
The household intertemporal budget constraint can be written as follows:






t − ft − τssf − T 2t + T 1t − τet
)
pt




where r is the interest rate, τssg , g = {fm} represents Social Security contributions, T 1t
represents income taxes paid by one-earner households and T 2t represents income taxes
paid by two-earner households. As stated above, τet stands for benefits taxed away as a
result of the Earnings Test applied to workers between the claiming age and the normal
retirement age.
A woman chooses to participate in the labor market in period t if
V M1t (at xt vt bt st)≥ V M0t (at xt vt bt st) (7)
After retirement from the labor market, the married household’s problem is simpli-
fied since the only decision that households make is the savings decision. The recursive
formulation of a household entitled to pension benefit b is as follows:






















where V MR(·) is the value function of a married household in which both husband
and wife are retired, V WfR(·) is the value function of a retired widow household and
V WmR(·) is the value function of a retired widower household.
The budget constraint in period t is given by
at+1 = (1 + r)
(
at + bft + bmt − Tt − ct
)
 (9)
where Tt represents the household’s income taxes. The problem of a widow household
can be defined similarly.
3. Calibration
In this section, we start by describing the different data sources used for quantitative
analysis (Section 3.1). Then we provide a detailed description of the process we follow to
8This is a common assumption in the literature that evaluates public pensions; see, for instance,
İmrohoroğlu and Kitao (2012) and French and Jones (2012).
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take our model to the data (Section 3.2). We specify the functional forms for the utility
function and the child care cost function and explain our calibration strategy. There are
two different set of parameters to be calibrated. First, there are some parameter values
that we borrow directly from earlier studies in the related literature. Second, there are
several parameters that we select so that our model economy resembles the data in a
number of specific dimensions. Finally, we assess the ability of the benchmark model
economy to account for different aspects of the data (Section 3.3).
3.1 Data
For the quantitative analysis, we calibrate our model economy to the behavior of the
cohort of women born in the US between 1944 and 1948, for whom we observe the re-
tirement decision. We have to use three different data sources to produce the different
statistics needed to calibrate our benchmark economy. Our main data source is the In-
tegrated Public Use Microdata Series—Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS) which
is based on a large representative sample of the US population. This is an integrated set
of microdata spanning from 1962 to 2014 of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The
IPUMS-CPS combines the labor information provided by the CPS with the data from
US decennial censuses that are part of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-USA
(IPUMS-USA). Thus, IPUMS-CPS takes advantage of the relatively large sample size of
IPUMS-USA at 10-year intervals and fills in information for the intervening years with
CPS data. We then select married women aged 60–64 in 2008 and follow them backward
and forward to obtain relevant statistics for our quantitative analysis. More precisely,
we obtain their complete life-cycle employment profile, their own earnings distribution
and that of their husbands and the distribution of their own pension benefit and those
of their husbands. However, IPUMS-CPS does not provide data on wealth so we use the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 2008 wave 4 core and topical mod-
ule data to calculate several statistics that we need for the quantitative analysis. SIPP is
a longitudinal survey of the resident population of the United States that excludes peo-
ple living in institutions and military barracks. The data in the core module file include
the basic demographic characteristics of each member of the household. These include,
among others, age, sex, marital status, and types and amounts of income. The data in the
topical module file includes assets and liabilities; real estate, dependent care, vehicles;
interest accounts, stocks, mortgages, value of business, and rental. We then merge the
core and topical modules and calculate the wealth distribution for our sample of mar-
ried households. Finally, we rely on the RAND HRS Data (version N) to calculate statis-
tics for the distribution of the number of years of labor market experience. The RAND
HRS Data file is a cleaned and streamlined version of 13 different waves (from 1992 to
2012) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that contains variables covering a broad
range of measures consistently across waves. In turn, the HRS is a longitudinal data set
representative of noninstitutionalized individuals aged 51 and over and their spouses.
It provides extensive information on demographics, income, labor status, health status,
and retirement status. In particular, our interest is on a variable that reports the number
of years of labor market experience for each woman at her claiming age.
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3.2 Parameters and targets
Demographics All women in our model begin their lives for our purposes at the age
of 25 with zero assets and retire from the labor market not later than 66 years of age.
We assume 66 to be the normal retirement age for the cohort of women that we target.
Individuals face lifetime uncertainty from the age of 66 onward but they all die once they
reach the age of 90. We target the death probabilities as reported by the Social Security
Administration.9 However, we calibrate the husband’s probability of death at the age
of 66 in order to target the fraction of widows in the data at that particular age (16%
according to the IPUMS-CPS).10
We assume that the public pension claiming age is exogenous at 62 for eligible
women.11 Husbands’ retirement age is exogenously given but we allow heterogeneity
across households in this respect. In particular, we consider five different types of house-
holds depending on the age at which the husband retires from the labor market and
claims his retired worker Social Security pension: 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66. We target the
distribution of husband claiming ages of our cohort.12
Finally, in regards to fertility, we introduce heterogeneity across households in the
age at which the first child arrives. We choose to mimic the mean and standard devia-
tion of the age on arrival of the first child, which are 22 and 4, respectively, for the co-
hort of women that we target here.13 To that end, we assume that there are two types
of households of equal measure in the total population: type one has two children, the
first of whom arrives when the parents are 20 (so these households are made up of two
adults and two children in the first model period); type two has two children, with the
first child arriving when the parents are 25. The second child arrives 3 years after the first
in both cases, again as observed in the data.
Earning The deterministic component of the male earnings process (αm1 and α
m
2 in
equation (3)) is set so that the model is consistent with earnings growth over the life
cycle as calculated in the IPUMS-CPS. We target earnings growth of 24% from the age
of 25 to 35 and of 08% from 36 to 64. Innovations to male earnings are assumed to have
a unit root. The standard deviation of the innovation for the husband’s earnings is as-
sumed to be 008, similar to estimates by Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011). Further-
more, we assume the initial variance of log earnings to be 020, which is also consistent
with their estimates. There is not much evidence on the variability of female earnings
so we assume the same process as that for men’s earnings. Finally, we assume that the
correlation coefficient between the husband and wife’s shocks is 025, as estimated by
Hyslop (2001). The parameters that characterize the effect of female labor market expe-
9See Social Security Administration Actuarial Life Table, 2007.
10As a result of this, the fraction of widows among women aged 66 or older that our model delivers is
39%. In the data, this figure is 44% in 2008.
11We can show that under the assumption that claiming age is 66, instead of 62, the impact of the different
reforms that we analyze on the female employment rate is of the same order of magnitude.
12According to Haaga and Johnson (2012) and the RAND HRS the distribution of claiming age for the
cohort of men born in the 1940s is as follows: 44% at 62, 14% at 63, 8% at 64, 21% at 65, and 13% at 66 or
older.
13See Human Fertility Database for the US.
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rience on earnings and the initial offered earnings gender gap have to be calibrated by
solving the model. To identify the effect of labor market experience on wages, we target
the two coefficients of a regression of female log wages on the number of years of ex-
perience and the squared number of years of experience as estimated by Eckstein and
Wolpin (1989).14 In particular, using simulated data we draw up an ordinary least square
estimate of
ln yft = γ1 + γ2xt + γ3x2t + ut (10)




2 in equation (4) so that the estimated
values of γ2 and γ3 in the data and in the simulations are the same.
Finally, we select an initial offered gender earnings gap yf0 /y
m
0 which enables us to
target the earnings gender gap of 054 in the age range 44 to 55 as obtained in the IPUMS-
CPS.
Child care cost We assume that the shape of the function kt which determines the
number of child care units needed by a family at age t depends on the number of chil-
dren and their ages. We normalize to 1 the units that are required by a family with two
infants (children aged zero to four). We assume that a 5-year-old child needs 20% fewer
units, as estimated using data from State Child Care Resource and Referral Network of-
fices for preschool children.15 Since data on child care cost is not available after that age
we assume that the cost for a child older than five is 80% lower than the cost of an infant
and that after the age of 15 chid care cost is zero.16 Finally the price q of each unit of
child care is calibrated by solving the model. In order to identify this figure, we target the
employment rate among women aged 25 to 29.
Social security We assume that the payroll income tax rate is equal to 124%, consis-
tent with observed values for the period 1988–2016. According to the US Pension rules,
the Workers’ Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is a piecewise linear function of the AIME
with three bend points. The PIA formula is progressive. In 2008, the first USD 711 per
month of relevant earnings attracts a 90% replacement rate. The band of earnings be-
tween USD 711 and USD 4288 per month is replaced at 32%. These thresholds are 21%
and 128% of the national average earnings, respectively. A replacement rate of 15% ap-
plies between the latter threshold and the earnings ceiling. The earnings ceiling for ben-
efits and contributions is USD 102,000 a year, corresponding to 253% of the national av-
erage earnings.17 Furthermore, a minimum of 10 years of contributions is required for a
person to be eligible for a public pension. The above PIA formula is used if an individual
first applies for and receives benefit at the normal retirement age of 66. However, indi-
viduals are eligible to apply for Social Security once they reach the earliest retirement
age of 62. Early receipt permanently reduces the benefit by the Actuarial Reduction Fac-
tor. In particular, those who retire at the age of 62 receive 75% of PIA, those who retire at
14They use the cohort of women aged 30 to 44 in 1967 in the National Longitudinal Survey.
15See Child Care Aware of America (2012).
16One could possibly rely on survey data of child care cost expenditures. However, this may be an un-
derestimation of the true costs since the cost is not observed for those who remain out of the labor force
because of the high child care cost they face.
17See OECD (2011).
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63 receive 80% of PIA, those who retire at 64 receive 87% of PIA and those who retire at 65
receive 93% of PIA. Individuals who initiate their claim after the official retirement age
are rewarded with an additional 8% of PIA per year through Delayed Retirement Credit.
As we explained above, in addition to individual pensions for those who are eligible, the
public pension system provides spousal and survivor pension benefits. If it is claimed
at the age of 65, the spousal benefit is equivalent to 50% of the husband’s benefit. There
is a 4% annual penalty for those who claim between 62 and 64. Wives eligible for both
individual and spousal benefits receive the larger of the two. The survivor pension ben-
efit is available for widows and it is equivalent to 100% of the deceased spouse’s benefit
if that amount is higher than the retired worker’s pension of the widow. Penalties also
apply to survivor pension benefit if it is claimed before normal retirement age. However,
we assume that individuals survive until the age of 66 with probability one, so survivor
pension benefit is effectively not claimed before that age in the model economy.
Finally, as explained above, there is an Earnings Test by which Social Security pen-
sion benefits are taxed away if the earnings of a benefit recipient who is below the nor-
mal retirement age exceed a certain statutory threshold. In particular, one dollar for each
two dollars of earnings in excess of the exempt amount is withheld until all Social Secu-
rity benefits are exhausted. The earning statutory threshold in 2008 is USD 13,556. Im-
portantly, according to the Social Security rules, we also consider in our model that after
the individual reaches the normal retirement age, the benefit entitlement is adjusted
upward to compensate for the benefits withheld.
Taxes Regarding income taxation, we follow Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014) to
capture the progressivity of the income tax system. In particular, we assume that the
average tax levied on a household with total taxable income It is given by t(Ĩt) = τ0 +
τ1 log(Ĩt) where Ĩt stands for multiples of average household income (i.e., Ĩt = ItĪ , with Ī
being average household income). We select τ0 and τ1 so that the average income tax of
a household with the mean income is 008 and the average income tax of a household
with four times the mean income is 017, as estimated in Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura
(2014).18 In order to calculate the household’s taxable income, we consider the complex
regime taxing Social Security benefits since 1983. According to this regime, benefits be-
come subject to income taxation when the Modified Adjusted Gross Income19 exceeds
a first statutory threshold of USD 32,000. Above it, the taxable portion of benefits phases
in starting at 50%. After a second statutory threshold of USD 44,000, the phase-in rate in-
creases to 85%. The phase in continues until 85% of Social Security benefits are included
in taxable income. This regime may significantly increase the marginal income tax rate
for older households with potential effects on labor supply. Interestingly, although Bur-
man, Coe, Pierce, and Tian (2014) do not find evidence of bunching at either of the statu-
tory thresholds (except among some of the self-employed), Jones and Li (2017) find that
the aggregate effects of benefits taxation occur mainly along the extensive margin and
that they are substantial.
18As in Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2012), we do however make the simplifying assumption that re-
turns on assets pay a flat tax, which we assume to be 20%.
19Modified Adjusted Gross Income includes most of the income and adjustments reflected on adjusted
gross income, plus tax-exempt interest and one-half of Social Security benefits.
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Preferences We assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function for consump-
tion with parameter σ and a utility cost of women’s work ψt that depends on age. There-






1 − σ −ψtpt (11)
where ctet is equivalized consumption and we use the McClements scale to determine
et .20 In regards to the utility cost of working, we assumeψt =ψ1 if t < t̄ andψt =ψ1( tt̄ )ψ2
if t ≥ t̄, with ψ2 > 1. This is intended to capture the increasing cost of working after a
certain age t̄. In particular, we consider the health status as important in accounting
for the declining profile of labor market participation at old ages (see, for instance, van
der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)). This may also capture other incentives to exit the labor
market that we ignore here21 and it would help the model to mimic the participation
rates at the end of the life cycle that can be observed in the data. We set t̄ at 55 and select
the employment rate of women aged 40 to 44 and the employment rate among women
aged 55 to 59 to calibrate ψ1 and ψ2. Finally, we assume a discount factor β of 098 and a
constant coefficient of relative risk aversion of 15 (within the range of the estimates by
Attanasio and Weber (1995)).
Other parameters We set the net rate of return on savings to equal the average real
return on three monthly T-bills at 0015.
To summarize, Table 1 shows the list of calibrated parameters together with the tar-
gets used for their identification. Heterogeneity in the cost of working over the life cycle
helps us to be consistent with the decreasing path of employment after the age of 55.
The price of child care that we calibrate implies that the child care cost for an infant
is about 20% of an average worker’s earnings in this economy. This is in line with the
20% reported by the OECD.22 In regards to labor market experience, we estimate wages
as a concave function of the number of years of labor market experience. Note that the
gender difference in the evolution of wages over time that we estimate is important in
accounting for the earnings gender gap in the model economy. In fact, according to our
estimates, female earnings are likely to be 080 of male earnings by the age of 65 even
if a woman has worked in every period. In addition, an initial female-to-male earnings
ratio of 059 is needed to target the average female-to-male earnings of 054. Note that in
the presence of positive self-selection of women in the labor market, as our model im-
plies,23 the exogenous gender earnings gap that we feed into the model (through both
the effect of experience on wages and the initial gender earnings gap) is higher than the
20According to the McClements scale, a childless couple is equivalent to 167 adults. A couple with one
child is equivalent to 19 adults if the child is less than three, to two adults if the child is between three and
seven, 207 adults if the child is between eight and 12, and 22 adults if the child is between 13 and 18.
21In particular, defined benefit holders tend to retire at early ages; see, for instance, Casanova (2010).
22See OECD family database Chart PF3.4.A: Childcare fees per 2-year old attending accredited early-years
care and education services, 2008.
23In the simulations, average earnings of working women are higher than average offered earnings at all
ages.
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Table 1. Calibration.
Targets Model Data
Women’s employment rate 25–29 043 041
Women’s employment rate 40–44 070 070
Women’s employment rate 55–59 065 062
Earnings gender gap (45–55) 054 054
γ̂2, Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) 002 002




















0 is the initial exogenous earnings
gender gap, and αf1 and α
f
2 shape the effect of labor market experience on wages.
observed gender earnings gap. Interestingly, positive self-selection is consistent with ev-
idence found by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008).
3.3 The benchmark economy
Our aim in this section is to offer a comparison of the model economy with the data
for several statistics that are relevant for the purposes of this paper. First, in Figure 1,
we show the full life-cycle employment profile of women born between 1944 and 1948
against the profile in our model economy. The profile in the data is smoother than that
in the simulations because the amount of heterogeneity in terms of fertility histories
that we are able to capture is limited. However, we believe that the model provides a rea-
sonable representation of women’s participation behavior over the life cycle. The female
employment rate increases up to the age of 45 and then stabilizes for several periods un-
til the age of 55 when it drops smoothly to the age of 65. Interestingly, the rate of decrease
in the employment rate is slightly attenuated between the claiming age and the normal
retirement age. This may be related to the Earning Test and the progressivity of income
tax. In particular, benefits withheld via the Earnings Test are credited to future benefits.
Because the crediting formula is more or less actuarially fair for the average recipient,
women, who live longer, may benefit from the Earnings Test, which would encourage
them to work. In addition, after the early claiming age some women have husbands who
have retired from the labor market, so the marginal income tax rate on female earnings
is lower.
Second, in the first panel of Table 2 we report the distribution of the number of years
of experience at the age of 60. Our model makes a reasonable job of accounting for the
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Figure 1. Female employment rate over the life cycle.
Table 2. Distribution of experience and earnings in the benchmark economy.
Model Data

















Note: Data sources: RAND HRS Data Version N. IPUMS-CPS, 1962–2012 waves, 2008 US dollars. SIPP 2008, Core and Topi-
cal. 2008 US dollars.
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Note: Data sources: SIPP 2008, Core and Topical. 2008 US dollars. Households aged 55–64.
distribution of the number of years of experience. This is important because this dis-
tribution is a summary statistic of the behavior of women over their life cycle and is
essential to determine their Social Security pension benefits.24 Third, in regards to la-
bor income, the second panel of Table 2 shows the earnings distribution for men and
women in middle age (45 to 54). It is important to note that the male earnings distribu-
tion is exogenous, but the female earnings distribution is endogenous because of both
the self-selection of women into the labor market and the returns on labor market ex-
perience that shape wages over the life cycle. The different percentiles are fairly similar
to what can be observed in the data, although there are some discrepancies at the bot-
tom of the distribution. Finally, another important dimension in which our model has
to be assessed is households’ asset holdings relative to income. As reported in Table 3,
the median assets across household income percentiles for households aged 55 to 64
vary in a similar fashion to those in the data, and are increasing with household income.
Furthermore, the size of the asset holdings is similar to the data at all percentiles.
Lastly, we look at the distribution of Social Security pension benefits in Table 4.25
There are points worth noting. First, the distribution of male pension benefits is fairly
similar to the data. Second, the fraction of women who are entitled to a Social Secu-
rity pension as retired workers only is 067, slightly above the fraction observed in the
data. Other women either only receive spousal pension benefit or they are dually enti-
tled as retired workers and spouses.26 Therefore, the fraction of women who are eligible
for spousal benefit, either as their only source of income or as a supplement to their re-
tired worker’s pension, is substantial. Finally, we report the distribution of pension ben-
efits for women who are entitled as retired workers exclusively and the distribution of
pension benefits for other women. Female Social Security pension benefits in the model
economy are fairly similar to those data.
24The model, however, underpredicts the amount of experience at the top of the distribution.
25It has to be taken into account that there is one source of discrepancy between the model and the data
since data values are calculated including disability pensions that tend to be lower than normal retired
worker’s pensions. Unfortunately, in the IPUMS-CPS survey those who receive a disability pension cannot
be identified separately from other Social Security beneficiaries. According to the Social Security Adminis-
tration in 2008, about 30% of Social Security beneficiaries aged 62 to 65 were receiving a disability pension.
An average disabled worker’s pension is about 9% lower than a normal retired worker’s pension.
26Unfortunately, in the data we cannot distinguish those women who receive a spousal pension benefit
only from those who receive it as a supplement to their retired worker’s pension.
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Fraction of women entitled as workers 067 060








Note: Data source: IPUMS-CPS, 1962–2012 waves. 2008 US dollars.
All in all we believe that the model provides a satisfactory picture of what is observed
in the data in terms of female labor market participation, earnings, assets, and Social
Security pension benefits, and, is therefore an appropriate framework for the policy as-
sessment exercises presented in Section 4.
4. Policy assessment
In this section, we explore the effect of three different reforms of the public pension
system in the US. First, we analyze the impact of removing spousal benefits (reform 1).
Second, we remove both spousal and survivor pension benefits (reform 2) and study the
effects. Finally, we increase from 35 to 40 the number of periods considered in calculat-
ing the AIME (reform 3). This last reform means that for individuals who have worked
for only 35 periods at a constant wage the retired worker’s pension would be reduced
by about 12% if labor supply is kept constant. We close this section with a robustness
analysis of the results to several of the assumptions in our benchmark economy.
4.1 The effect on employment
The very substantial impact of reforms 1 and 2 on the life-cycle employment profile
is depicted in Figure 2. Table 5 reports the employment rate changes for different age
groups. The largest effect of reform 1 is found in late middle age, in particular from 45
to 59, with an average increase of 7 percentage points within each age group. The effect
is also strong within the 40 to 44 age group, with almost 5 additional points of participa-
tion with respect to the benchmark. The employment rate among women younger than
40 shows a more moderate increase as a result of the reform but at about 2 percentage
points the effect is not negligible. Obviously, the effect of reform 2 is larger in magnitude
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Figure 2. Life-cycle female employment rate.
as it removes spousal and survivor pension benefits altogether. After the age of 40, the
increase in the employment rate is about 13 percentage points on average. Noticeably,
the effect is also substantial at younger ages, ranging from 3 percentage points at ages 25
to 29 to almost 11 percentage points at ages 40 to 44. In order to assess the magnitude of
these effects, it is important to note that as a result of reform 2, the average household’s
pension income would be reduced by 42% in the absence of any labor supply response.
Furthermore, the elimination of the survivor pension benefit would leave women who
are not eligible for a retired worker’s pension with savings as the only insurance mecha-
nism against lifetime uncertainty.27
To help understand the consequences of policy reforms 1 and 2 on employment, in
Table 6 we investigate their impact across households conditional upon several charac-
teristics. First, we consider exogenously given characteristics such as the age at which
27The predicted effects of the policy reforms that we find are larger than in Kaygusuz (2015), who predicts
an increase in the female participation rate of 47 percentage points. Ignoring labor market uncertainty
and returns to experience and focusing on a cohort of women who are more attached to the labor market
than the one we consider in our benchmark calibration, are reasons for the smaller effect. In Nishiyama
(2010), the effect on the female employment rate is about 15 percentage points on average, but the presence
of single women in the economy reduces the aggregate effect of the policy. Furthermore, this paper also
ignores returns to experience. Finally, in a recent paper by Groneck and Wallenius (2017), the predicted
change of removing spousal and survivor pension benefits is of 78 percentage points in the married female
employment rate (under the assumption that additional tax revenue is used for government consumption).
Although these authors take into account returns to labor market experience, their focus is on younger
women who are more attached to the labor market and they incorporate the risk of divorce into the analysis,
which can potentially mitigate the effect of the policy reform.
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Table 5. Change in employment rate with respect to the benchmark (percentage points).
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3
25–29 120 330 065
30–34 233 566 004
35–39 319 729 −002
40–44 469 1074 020
45–49 726 1421 016
50–54 749 1480 016
55–59 549 1327 040
60–65 062 1041 053
Note: Reform 1: removing spousal benefit, reform 2: removing both spousal and survivor pension benefits, and reform 3:
increasing the number of periods used in calculating the AIME from 35 to 40.
the first child arrives and the age at which the husband retires. The effects of the policy
reforms are similar across households which have children at different ages and across
households in which the husband retires from the labor market at different ages. It is
interesting to note that the higher the female employment, the lower the husband’s re-
tirement age. This may suggests that if the husband’s retirement age was endogenous,
the effect on female labor supply could be dampened. Second, we classify households
according to the type of entitlement of wives in the benchmark economy, which is an
endogenous outcome. We distinguish between the group of women who are entitled
as retired workers only and the group of women who are either dually entitled or enti-
tled as spouses only. Not surprisingly, we observe that the effect of the policy reforms
is very different across these two groups (with an increase of 5 percentage points af-
ter reform 2 for the first group and an increase of 21 percentage points for the second
group). Although the effect of the reforms is small among women in the first group, it is
positive. The positive impact for this group is related to the presence of uncertainty in
the economy, where the elimination of the minimum pension for second earners (that
the spousal benefit guarantees) fosters female labor supply. However, the effect is very
large among women who belong to the second group. This group of women has a strong
incentive to increase participation in order to be eligible for a worker’s Social Security
pension benefit. Their average experience at claiming age increases from 6 to 10 in the
case of reform 1 and from 6 to 14 in the case of reform 2. As Table 7 reports, the strongest
effect of the policy reforms are found in late middle age.
All in all the effect on the female employment rate of reforms 1 and 2 is sizeable,
with an average increase of 4 percentage points in the case of reform 1 and 10 percent-
age points in the case of reform 2. Furthermore, the effect is visible at all ages. Hence
we conclude that the consideration of a full life-cycle model is important for assessing
the elimination of spousal and survivor pension benefits, which are currently important
provisions of the public pension system in the US.
Finally, we explore the impact of extending from 35 to 40 the number of periods to be
considered in calculating the AIME. As reported in the last column of Table 5, this type
of reform has a mild effect of less than 1 percentage point on the female employment
rate. The effect is more visible at the beginning and end of the life cycle.
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Table 6. Employment rate by different household characteristics.
Benchmark Reform 1 Reform 2
All 060 064 070
Age on having first child
young 063 067 073
old 057 062 068
Husband’s retirement age
62 062 066 071
63 061 065 071
64 061 066 072
65 057 061 068
66 056 060 068
Woman entitled as
retired worker only 083 084 088
spousal beneficiary 014 024 035
Table 7. Employment rate before and after the reforms by type of entitlement in the bench-
mark.
Benchmark Reform 1 Reform 2
Entitled as retired worker only
25–29 057 059 061
30–34 078 080 083
35–39 090 092 095
40–44 094 097 098
45–49 096 098 099
50–54 097 098 099
55–59 092 092 095
60–65 063 062 074
Entitled as spousal beneficiary
25–29 013 014 017
30–34 015 018 022
35–39 018 023 031
40–44 020 029 044
45–49 018 036 055
50–54 018 039 058
55–59 010 027 043
60–65 003 006 013
4.2 The effect on inequality
The implications of the reforms analyzed here go beyond their effect on the female em-
ployment rate. Table 8 shows the effect of the policy reforms on several other statistics
for households aged 66 and older. The average female benefit decreases from 13,349 in
the benchmark economy to 11,685 in the economy without spousal benefits. As a result,
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Table 8. The effect on pensions and inequality.
Benchmark Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3
Average women’s pension 13,349 11,685 9734 11,922
Fraction of women entitled as workers 067 083 089 066
Average household’s Social Security income 23,316 22,487 19,971 22,456
Gini Index of household’s Social Security income 01765 01704 02935 01789
Average household’s consumption 40,614 40,639 40,479 40,262
Gini Index of household’s consumption 02285 02258 02409 02298
Average household’s wealth 185,389 192,918 242,805 191,271
Gini Index of household’s wealth 04633 04611 04207 04766
Note: Households aged 66 and older.
the average household’s Social Security income also decreases. This is obviously due to
the fact that married women who are not eligible for a retired worker’s pension are not
receiving any benefits from Social Security. Furthermore, as a result of the increase in the
employment rate, there are more women eligible for retired worker’s pensions (the frac-
tion goes from 67% to 83%), but these are on average less productive than the women
who were already eligible in the benchmark economy. The further removal of survivor
pension benefit reduces the average female benefit to 9734. Note that the elimination
of the survivor pension benefit increases the fraction of women who are eligible for a
retired worker’s pension to 89%, but still leaves some women with no public pension,
during marriage and widowhood. Of course, the negative direct effect of this pension
reform on the average pension dominates the positive effect of the slight increase in the
average years of experience of eligible women, which goes up from 29 in the benchmark
to 30 after reform 1 and to 31 after reform 2.28 Finally, as can be seen in the fourth row of
the table, reform 2 has a dramatic effect on the household’s pension income inequality
with the Gini index going from 01765 in the benchmark to 02935. However, the impact
on the household’s consumption inequality is much more moderate (the Gini index goes
up from 02285 to 02409) and it is noticeable that the average household’s consumption
for the elderly remains pretty stable. The interpretation of this result is that households
use assets to smooth consumption over their life cycle. Finally, the average household’s
wealth increases substantially, in particular after reform 2. The increase in wealth is un-
even across households as reflected on the decrease of the Gini index of wealth.
4.3 The effect on public expenditure and fiscal revenues
Finally, Table 9 reports the impact of each reform on Social Security expenditure and on
fiscal revenues. As expected, the reduction in Social Security expenditure is very sizeable
in the case of all three reforms. In addition, Social Security revenues and income tax rev-
enues increase as a result of the increase in labor supply that the policy reforms imply
(with the exception of reform 3 where the effects on employment are found to be neg-
ligible). The increase in Social Security revenues goes from 12% after reform 1 to 33%
28Having more years of experience positively affects the AIME (and, therefore, the pension benefit), di-
rectly through the number of periods considered in computing it and indirectly through higher wages.
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Table 9. Variation in expenditure and revenues (percentage change).
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3
Social Security expenditure −31 −110 −38
Social Security revenues 12 32 00
Income tax revenues 20 50 00
after reform 2, whereas revenues from income tax go up by 19% as a result of reform 1
and by 49% as a result of reform 2.
4.4 Robustness analysis
In this section, we provide a discussion of several assumptions of our analysis that may
affect the results of the policy experiments that we undertake.
Claiming age We assume in our benchmark economy that the public pension claiming
age is exogenous at 62. In order to assess the robustness of our results to this assump-
tion, we show the effect of the three policy reforms under the alternative assumption of
an exogenous claiming age of 66 in Table S.2 of Appendix C (available in a supplemen-
tary file on the journal website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/667/supplement.pdf). The
magnitude of the changes in the female employment rate in response to the elimination
of the spousal and the survivor’s pension benefits or to the increase from 35 to 40 of
the number of periods considered to calculate the AIME is of similar size to that in our
benchmark economy.
Younger cohorts As explained in Section 3, we target a cohort of women for which we
observe the complete labor market history and several statistics related to their Social
Security benefits. One concern with our analysis may be that the effect of the reforms
that we analyze may be smaller among younger cohorts of women that tend to be more
attached to the labor market. As discussed in the Introduction, the literature exploring
the causes of changes in female labor participation is large. Several studies find that
lower child care costs, larger returns to experience, a lower gender wage gap, and a
higher divorce rate are among the driving forces of the trend in female labor supply over
the last few decades in the US. In order to assess what would be the effect of the pol-
icy reforms that we analyze here on the participation of younger cohorts of women, we
implement a reduction of child care costs, an increase in the returns to experience, and
an increase in the exogenous gender wage gap with respect to our benchmark economy
such that the life-cycle employment profile and the gender earnings gap are similar to
those observed for the cohort of women born in 1964–1968.29 As a result of the higher
29In particular, we implement a 50% increase in the returns to experience, similar to Fernández and
Wong (2014), a reduction of the child care cost to target the 66% employment rate of the 1964–1968 cohort
at ages 25–29, and a decrease in the exogenous gender wage gap to target the ratio of male earnings relative
to female of 062.
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female labor market attachment, the fraction of women who are entitled as workers goes
up from 67% in the case of the 1944–1949 cohort to 74% in the case of the 1964–1968 co-
hort. This figure is close to the 71–75% projections in Butrica and Smith (2012). Within
this new scenario, we compute what would be the effect of the policy reforms and re-
port them in Table S.3 of Appendix C (available in a supplementary file on the journal
website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/667/supplement.pdf). The effect of the reforms is
moderately smaller than the one computed for the cohort of women born in 1944–1948.
The female employment rate increases by 86 percentage points, instead of 10. The sim-
ilarity of the results may be related to the fact that differences in employment between
the two cohorts are much more pronounced at early ages than at later ages, together
with the fact that the strongest effect of the policy reform is found precisely at those
later ages.
Never-married women and the risk of divorce Our focus in this paper is only on mar-
ried women, but one may be concerned with the fact that the fraction of women who
remain single over their entire life has increased substantially over time. Obviously, the
aggregate effect of the reforms we study here would be smaller the higher the fraction
of never-married women, since the elimination of the spousal and survivor benefits are
expected to have no effect on them. However, according to Butrica and Smith (2012b),
the fraction of never married women at the age of 70 is projected to increase from 6%
among the leading boomers (1946–1955) to 10% among GenXers (1966–1975). Therefore,
even among recent cohorts, the fraction of never-married women is moderate. Finally,
the incidence of divorce has increased substantially among the population. In spite of
that, remarriage is very frequent and according to Butrica and Smith (2012b), the pro-
jected fraction of divorced women at the age of 70 is around 20% for both of the afore-
mentioned cohorts.30 More importantly, according to these authors, the percentage of
divorced women at the age of 70 who have at least one marriage that lasted at least 10
years31 is projected to be stable at around 70%.32 All in all, we believe that the effect of
the policy reforms would remain substantial in a scenario in which marital status uncer-
tainty is considered, but we leave that analysis for future research.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we use a partial equilibrium life-cycle model of household savings and
female labor market participation decisions to assess several reforms of the US Social
Security pension system. In our model, individuals face earnings uncertainty as well as
lifetime uncertainty. In addition, a distinctive feature is that returns on labor market ex-
perience operate so participation decisions affect not only current earnings and Social
30The fraction of divorced women at the age of 70 increases from 16% in war babies (1936–1945) to 20%
in the leading boomers (1946–1955).
31Divorced women who were married for at least 10 years are eligible for the spousal and survivor pen-
sion benefit.
32This figure went down from 80% in war babies (1936–1945) to 70% in leading boomers (1946–1955).
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Security pension benefits but also future earnings. Within this framework, we assess the
effect of removing spousal benefit, removing spousal and survivor pension benefits al-
together, and extending from 35 to 40 the number of periods of the working career that
are considered in calculating the retired workers’ Primary Insurance Amounts. Our fo-
cus is on the effects of these reforms on the female full life-cycle participation profile.
We find that the effect is very substantial after the age of 40, but is also sizeable before
that age. Average participation increases by 4 percentage points when spousal benefit
is eliminated and by 10 percentage points when both spousal and the survivor pension
benefits are taken away. The extension from 35 to 40 in the number of periods that are
considered in calculating a retired workers’ Primary Insurance Amounts has a negligible
effect on the female employment rate. Finally, although removing spousal and survivor
pension benefits dramatically increases Social Security income inequality there is only
a small increase in consumption inequality because households use savings to smooth
consumption over the life cycle. All three of the reforms that we analyze substantially
reduce Social Security expenditure and reforms 1 and 2 both produce an important in-
crease in fiscal revenues.
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